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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the probable :Lmpact on S&Ls' profitability and
participation in mortgage markets of The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980. It tracks inflation—induced secular declines
in the value of S&L mortgage holdings between 1965 and 1979 and argues
(contrary to conventional wisdom) that deposit—rate ceilings proved no more
than a minor and temporary source of help to S&Ls. Analysis presented shows
that Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation guarantees, not deposit—
rate ceilings, kept the industry afloat in recent years.
Further analysis centers on federal and state restrictions on S&L loan
opportunities and on mortgage lenders' ability to design and to price mortgage
instruments for an environment marked by accelerating inflation and increasing
inflation uncertainty. Since S&Ls were free to raise whatever amount of funds
they wished through large certificates of deposit, restrictions on S&L lending
opportunities had to lie responsible for the much—publicized bouts of disintermedia—
tion these institutions suffered near post—1965 business—cycle peaks.
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AND THE FLOW OF HOUSING FINANCE
Edward J. Kane*
To set readers' minds atease, let me emphasize that the title'soperative
word most assuredly is reregulation. Inthe halls of Congress and forindustry
spokespersons, the word deregulationmay have useful overtones, but few curren-
cies devalue as relentlessly as thelanguage of U.S. politics. DID MCA (theacronym
for the schizophrenicany namedDepository Institutions Deregulation andMonetary
Control Act of 1980) by no meanssweeps away deposit-institution regulation. it
realigns a number of government-eflfr rulesof operation in hopes ofcorrecting
some palpable "bugs" in the old system.Although DIDMCA sets out to relax major
constraints on deposit-institutionbehavior, it proposes to do so partially,gradually,
and in a discretionary manner. On therestrictive side of the coin, DIDMCAapplies
Fed reserve requirements for the firsttime to roughly 9,000 nonmembercommer-
cial banks, 5,000 S&Ls, 500 mutualsavings banks, and 22,000 credit unions. Toput
the distinction more forcefully, ifwe agree to call DID MCA deregulation, theword
dc-deregulation cannot be far behind.
Turning to the other issues in the title, thepaper argues that DID MCA's
effects on S&L profitability andon S&L participation in mortgage marketsShould
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prove relatively mild. This conclusion follows from analysis which indicates that
FSLIC insurance, not deposit-rate ceilings, has kept the industry afloat in the face
of inflation-induced declines in the value of S&L mortgage holdings. As inflation
has driven insured S&Ls' "bookable" net worth further and further under water,
FSLIC guarantees have become a more and more powerful source of unbookable
capital. At the same time, disintermediation and regulation-induced innovation
have made differential deposit-rate ceilings increasingly less able to insulate S&Ls
from market pressure to pay households the opportunity cost of their funds.
1. The Major Problem: Secular Deterioration of S&L Net Worth
During the last decade, nostalgia for the 1950s and early 1960s burgeoned
into a national mania. Everyday items from this silver age —recordings,films,
magazines, and even comic books and bubble-gum cards —becamecollectors items
and rose rapidly in value. Although second to none in their yearning for these
quieter times, S&L managers made out far less well than junk collectors. S&Ls'
near-mint collections of antiquated mortgage contracts were completely by-passed
by the boom. Far from appreciating, these vintage low-rate assets suffered a
decade and a half of nearly uninterrupted decline in market value. This secular
deterioration in the discounted present value of thrift-institution mortgage port—
folios (which comprise over 80 percent of S&L assets) stands at the root of
recurring profitability and solvency problems that have plagued this industry and
federal banking regulators for the last fifteen years.
Recent improvements in secondary markets for mortgages make it possible
for individual S&Ls to originate mortgages without permanently warehousing them.
Selling mortgages in the secondary market lets S&Ls separate the income they can
derive from their specialized capacity for mortgage origination and servicing from3
the compensation that any investor could anticipate for bearing interest-rate
risk.L" But traditionally the industry's business has been mortgage lending and
interest arbitrage. S&Ls have survived by issuing a combination of insured deposits
and uninsured nondeposit liabilities whose anticipated total interest cost (including
implicit and explicit elements) lies below the yields they expect to earn by
investing the proceeds in mortgage loans and other eligible assets. On balance, the
spread between expected yields on S&L assets and liabilities compensates these
institutions for servicing liabilities that are shorter in maturity and smaller in
denomination than S&L assets.'
a. The Putative Dangers of DIDMCA
S&L lobbyists have long claimed that, painful as they might have been for
small savers, differential deposit-rate ceilings were necessary both for their
industry's survival and for the good of the housing industry. With this background
and with DIDMCA being sold as deregulation, the financial press has tended to
exaggerate its potential for impacting unfavorably on thrift institutions and on the
housing sector. This pessimistic viewpoint has been put forward by Michael Evans
(who foresees the "death" of the S&L business) and even more forcefully by the
most-famous economist of our time: a man who studied at the London School of
Economics, Mick Jagger of the Rolling Stones.
Jagger's analysis is enshrined in the lyrics to "Out of Time." As the
cognoscenti among us know, Mick has a serious case of the mumbles. To grasp the
full meaning of his comments, listeners must recognize that what sounds to
laypersons like the word "Baby" is actually "Es-lay," the pronunciation he favors for
"SLA," a widely-used acronym for savings-and-loan association:
You're obsolete my SLA
My poor old-fashioned SLA
I said: SLA, SLA, SLA
You're out of time.4
Well, SLA, SLA, SLA, you're out of time
I said, SLA, SLA, SLA, you're out of time
Yes, you are left ouU
Out of there without a doubt,
'cause, SLA, SLA, SLA you're out of time.
With all due respect, I believe that on this subject the Mick Jaggers of this
world are only half-right. Existing SLAs may indeed be "out of time," in the sense
that (like dinosaurs or H.G. Wells' time—traveller) most of them are adapted to
function in a different era, one in which yield curves are perennially positive in
slope and interest rates fluctuate within relatively narrow bounds.' But we can
show that, although S&Ls' legacy of negative "bookable" net worth and extensive
branch—office systems leaves them seemingly in poor shape to weather the rigors of
competing in modern capital markets, they are neither "out of time" nor out of
capital. Neither DID MCA nor the FSLIC proposes that S&Ls adjust at once. As
long as FSLIC examiners continue to overlook unbooked losses on mortgage assets,
FSLIC guarantees are a substantial source of S&L capitaL Also, DID MCA promises
them at least six more years of some form of differential deposit-rate ceilings and
the opportunity to lobby for additional help if an interim crisis should ensue.
However, by weakening the FHLBB (through ceding potential reserve-requirement
authority to the Fed and eliminating veto power over increases in Reg Qceilings),
DIDMCA reduces the industry's political clout.At the same time, because
DID MCA makes it hard for S&L lobbying activity to influence the future of
deposit-rate ceilings, it is redirecting industry lobbying efforts toward reshaping
restrictions that govern the asset side of S&L balance sheets. Relaxing these
restrictions will make capital markets more efficient and help to eliminate the
cyclical credit crunch in housing finance.
b. Effects of Unanticipated Inflation on the Market Value of Mortgage Loans Made
in the Past
As accelerating inflation drove interest rates on new mortgages progressively
higher, institutions that at past dates had issued large amounts of fixed-rate mort—5
gages found themselves overwhelmed by a widening earnings gap. Measured
against the hypothetical cash flow necessary to keep the mortgage portfolio's
market value from depreciating below its book value, accelerating inflation has the
same effect as if past mortgagors were "defaulting" in inflation-adjusted dollars on
an increasing fraction of promised interest payments. Tables 1 and 1-A present
annual estimates of this cumulative "pseudo—default rate" for each of the last 15
years. The pseudo—default rate is calculated as the proportionate shortfall of a
weighted-average yield on S&Ls' aggregate mortgage portfolio relative to the
effective rate on new mortgage contracts constructed by the FHLBB. Although
the year-to-year timing of pseudo—defaults varies between the two tables, the
cyclical pattern is much the same. Pseudo—defaults rise and fall with the interest
rate on new mortgage loans.
Multiplying the latest available pseudo-default rate by the ratio of insured
S&Ls' mortgage loans and contracts to total assets (82.3 percent in December,
1979) produces an upward-biased estimate of approximately 20 percent f or the
percentage value of cumulated unbooked losses in S&L mortgage portfolios. In
principle, this loss is chargeable against S&L net worth. However, our calculation
overstates aggregate losses in important ways. First, only a small fraction of
mortgage loans remain outstanding until maturity. The life expectancy of a
representative mortgage loan lies substantially below its typically 20-to—30 year
term to maturity. HUD data on the survivorship of FHA loans made since 1957
indicate an 11.4—year average life for 20-year mortgages and a 13.2-year life for
25-year and 30-year mortgages-( In future years, prepayments received at par may
be anticipated to lessen the percentage of mortgage loans earning antiquated
interest rates. On the other hand, mortgage life expectancy tends to rise and fall
with the pseudo-default rate, because from the borrower's point of view the6
TABLE 1
CALCULATED YIELDS AND CUMULATIVE PSEUDO-DEFAULT RATES ON
AGGREGATE MORTGAGE HOLDINGS OF INSURED S&Ls, 1965-1979
Average
Effective FHLBB Proportionate Shortfall in
Annual Yield Series of Mortgage-Income
on Book Effective Yield
Value of Mortgage (Pseudo—Default
Mortgage Interest Rate on
Holdings of Rates on S&L Mortgage
Insured S&Ls New Homes Loans)
(in percent per annum) (in percent per annum) (in percent)
1965 5.59 5.81 3.79
1966 5.82 6.25 6.88
1967 5.74 6.46 11.15
1968 5.84 6.97 16.21
1969 6.05 7.81 22.54
1970 6.21 8.45 26.51
1971 6.20 7.74 19.90
1972 6.31 7.60 16.97
1973 6.72 7.95 15.47
1974 7.07 8.92 20.74
1975 7.10 9.01 21.20
1976 7.20 8.99 19.91
1977 7.35 9.01 18.42
1978 7.72 9.54 19.08
1979 8.21 10.77 23.77
Source: Effective Annual Yields are calculated from income and balance—sheet data
in U.S. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Combined Financial Statements:
FSLIC-Insured Savings and Loan Associations (Annual). FHLBB mortgage
interest rates are reported on p. 68 of this same source. This rate consists
of the contract rate plus fees and charges amortized over a 10-year period.
Pseudo-default rates are calculated as the difference between unity and the
ratio of the figures in column one to the corresponding entry in column two.7
Table 1—A
ALTERNATIVE CALCULATION OF YIELDS AND CUMULATIVE PSEUDO-DEFAULTRATES ON
AGGREGATE MORTGAGE HOLDINGS OF INSURED S&Ls, 1965-1980
FHLBB Proportionate Shortfall in
Series of Mortgage—Income Effective Yield
Mortgage (Pseudo-Default
Mortgage Return Interest Rate on on Rates on S&L Mortgage
Mortgages Held New Homes Loans) (in percent per annum)(in percent per annum) (in percent)
1965 5.93 5.81 —2.07
1966 5.94 6.25 4.96
1967 6.01 6.46 6.97
1968 6.13 6.97 12.05
1969 6.32 7.81 19.08
1970 6.56 8.45 22.37
1971 6.81 7.74 12.02
1972 6.98 7.60 8.16
1973 7.17 7.95 9.81
1974 7.43 8.92 16.70
1975 7.66 9.01 14.98
1976 7.95 8.99 11.57
1977 8.21 9.01 8.88
1978 8.47 9.54 11.22
1979 8.83 10.77 18.01
1980 (January—June) 9.18 12.63* 27.32
Source:Interest return on mortgages held from Federal Home Loan BankBoard
Journal (monthly); mortgage interest rates from Combined Financial
Statements: FSLIC-Insuped Savings and Loan Associations (annual). This
rate consists of the contract rate phiilees and charges amortizedover a
10-year period. Pseudo-default rates are calculated as the difference
between unity and the ratio of the figures in column one to the
corresponding entry in column two.
*To parallel the construction of the FHLBB Series of Effective InterestRates, this is
calculated as the average of monthly rates observed betweenJanuary and June of 1980.8
calculation expresses the opportunity loss of prepaying outstanding loans at par.
Second, S&Ls have unrealized capital gains on their branch-office real estate and
secularly rising interest rates have caused the book value of certificate and
nondeposit liabilities to be overstated. But even if we were to cut our estimate of
unrealized net charges to one-half of the 19.56-percent figure, it would still exceed
by an uncomfortable margin S&Ls' 5.5-percent ratio of capital accounts to assets.
For stock S&Ls to sell at positive market values (as indeed they do), the excess of
unrealized losses over net-worth accounts must be counterbalanced by off-balance-
sheet items impounded in the unbooked value of S&L charters.
S&L charter values may be conceived as the risk-adjusted present value of
future after-tax earnings. Existing S&Ls have established a reputation for fair
dealing and a network of contacts in their local real-estate communities whose
value may be subsumed under the heading of "good will.T In addition, because the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) are required to serve as friendly regulators, we may presume
that (at least in the short run) charter values are enhanced by:
1. entry regulation 2deposit-rateregulation
3. FHLBB advances policy
4. the pricing and administration of federal deposit insurance.
For any S&L whose bookable net worth is negative, the value of FSLJC
insurance is obviously substantial. It is clear that a good many S&Ls could not
remain in business if their deposit insurance were suddenly withdrawn. The next
section of the paper develops the hypothesis that since 1965 the pricing of FSLIC
insurance privileges has been the dominant element in unbooked value.
3. FSLIC Insurance To The Rescue
When managers permit an apparently pathological condition to persist for 15
years, we have to wonder whether it serves some positive purpose. This section of9
the paper shows that, for individual S&Ls, negative "bookable" net worth can be
interpreted as a static equilibrium position. This follows from the Modigliani-
Miller model that serves at the cornerstone of the modern theory of corporate
finance.
a. Might S&L Managers Be Content with Negative "Bookable" Net Worth?'
Modigliani-Miller theorems focus on a firm that holds a fixed collection of
assets and investigate whether the mix of debt and equity by which it chooses to
finance these holdings affects the value of the firm. Assuming away bankruptcy
costs, taxes on corporate income, and other market imperfections, Modigliani and
Miller (M&M) showed first that in competitive capital markets the value of a firm
is independent of its financial structure.' Restoring one or more of the excluded
conditions tends to prevent capital-structure decisions from being a matter of
indifference to a firm's management. In particular, M&M have shown that, when
interest on debt is tax-deductible and the other two conditions continue to hold,
management has an incentive (in the form of tax savings) to substitute debt for
equity in its financial structure. The tax subsidy establishes a positive benefit for
increases in debt that leads managers to a zero-equity corner solution. Under
these circumstances, management wants to work with as little net worth as it can.
For a firm whose assets are risky, increasing leverage increases the proba-
bility of bankruptcy.When bankruptcy imposes costs on lenders and firm
managers, the increasing probability of insolvency provides a growing offset to the
marginal benefit from expanding debt. With costly bankruptcy and tax-subsidized
debt, a value-maximizing firm may reach a noncorner optimum, with positive
equity in its financial strueture.1 This is illustrated by the lower curve in Figure I.
In this diagram, V denotes the value of an uninsured S&L that has no deposit












Present Value of Deposit Debt
Figure I. Value of an Insured and UninsuredS & L11
liquidation value of the assets it holds. This value is plotted on the vertical axis.
The value of a levered firm is, of course, the sum of the value of its equity and the
value of its debt. The V curve shows how the value of an uninsured S&L wouldvary
as its management substitutes deposit debt for equity in its financial structure. At
the point of zero equity (Dmao), deposit debt finances the firm's entire asset
portfolio.In the case illustrated, the tax subsidy garnered through additional
leverage raises the value of the firm only until the combination V0 and D0 is
reached; further leverage decreases firm value. D0, the debt at which the peak
firm value V0 occurs, corresponds to the optimal financial structure for a
stockholder-managed uninsured S&L.
Next we introduce deposit insurance into the diagram. To focus on the
market value of federal deposit insurance 2 se, we ignore the existence of
nondeposit liabilities and the possibility that the FSLIC might default on its
insurance obligations. We also assume that insurance coverage extends to all
deposit balances, neglecting the de j limit that applies to very large accounts.
We begin by supposing that FSLIC insurance is absolutely free to eligible
institutions. This means that explicit fees are zero and no implicit charges are
levied in the form of regulatory interference. If an insured S&L should become
insolvent, the FSLIC promises to satisfy depositor claims without levying any prior
charges on the S&L. This brings us to what is the central point in our analysis:
that free insurance reinstates the zero—equity corner solution that arises when
bankruptcy is costless to the firm.
Introducing a second curve into Figure I lets us plot the value of an S&L
insured for free (V1) on the same scale as the value of an uninsured S&L (V).
Because insured debt must sell (irrespective of the degree of an S&L's leverage)
always at the market-determined riskiess rate, substituting tax-subsidized debt for12
equity increases the value of the firm at a constant rate. This rate equals the
present discounted value of the tax savings effected. For each possible level of
S&L leverage, the vertical distance between the two curves (V1 minus V) portrays
the market value of free insurance to the client S&L. Merton and Sharpe join
others in suggesting that deposit insurers should charge an explicit insurance
premium sufficient to exhaust the differential in the value of the insured and
uninsured firm.' When insurance fees are set according to this "fair-value rule",
the insurance premium drops out of S&L managers' marginal calculations. For each
and every level of deposits, the value of the firm net of the insurance premium
would coincide with its uninsured value. With or without insurance, S&L managers
who maximize the value of their firm would operate at the deposit level, D0, and
the firm would be worth V°
In practice, the FSLIC sets an explicit premium that is both independent of
client S&Ls' asset risk and capital structure. An institution's explicit insurance
fees increase directly with the amount of its deposits, but at a rate that eventually
(if not perhaps from the very first dollar of debt) fails to exhaust the value of
insurance services to the firm. This pricing strategy was adopted originally to
entice state-chartered S&Ls to submit themselves voluntarily to federal regulation.
The problem with this approach is that it generates excess demand for FSLIC
insurance services, in the form of expanded risk—taking by client S&Ls. As Figure I
makes clear, the benefits of deposit insurance increase with leverage. Unless the
marginal cost of FSLIC insurance is at some point made to rise with leverage,
individual S&Ls would not voluntarily hold any net worth.
To control the excess demand for its services that its structure of explicit
prices tends to generate, the FSLIC is forced to develop a structure of implicit
prices. Regulations imposed on client S&Ls as a condition for receiving FSLIC13
insurance (particularly net-worth requirements) reduce the net value ofdeposit
insurance to them. This loss in firm value constitutes an implicit premium that
S&Ls pay for FSLIC insurance. At the margin, we may suppose that to insure
additional risk each insured S&L would have to pay a total (i.e., implicit and
explicit) premium that would exceed the value of the additional insurance services
it would receive. However, the approach to this margin is notvery smooth and
inframarginal subsidies almost surely exist.
Although possible, it is unlikely that the FSLIC manages to vary over time
the rate at which its implicit premiums increase with S&L leverage so as to keep
the sum of implicit and explicit premiums for every client exactly equal to the
market value of the insurance services delivered. This is unlikely for two reasons.
First, the main element in the implicit premium is a capital-adequacy requirement
whose cost kicks in discontinuously. Second, S&Ls' political clout —demonstrated
by their ability to demand differential ceilings on deposit interest rates —has
allowed them, in the face of threatened insolvencies, to pressure FSLIC officials
into not exercising their options to close under—water institutions unless they allow
the book value of their net worth to deteriorate or show evidence of dishonest
management or overly agressive risk-taking.
b. Federal Income Taxes as Implicit Fees Paid For FSLIC Insurance
Table 1 shows that, in the years prior to DID MCA, insured S&Ls had
substantial amounts of unbooked capital losses in their mortgage portfolios. U.S.
tax law permits an S&L, in determining its taxable income, to write off such losses
in full when and as they are realized. In every year since 1966, S&Ls' unrealized
mortgage losses were sufficient in the aggregate to wipe out their federal income-
tax liability. Table 2 shows that insured S&Ls continued to make positive tax
payments. Aggregating (without reweighting for asset growth) between 1965 and14
Table 2
FEDERAL INCOME TAXES PAID BY INSURED S&L'S TO NET OPERATING
INCOME AND TOTAL ASSETS, 1965-1979
(Dollar Amounts in Millions)
Tax-rate percentage
Before—Tax Federal Taxes Federal Taxes
Federal Net over Before-Tax over Total
Year Taxes Income Assets Net Income Assets
1965 133.63 953.08 124,456 14.02 .11
1966 96.79 756.79 128,885 12.79 .07
1967 93.78 719.25 138,507 13.04 .07
1968 148.50 995.61 147,753 14.91 .10
1969 194.49 1,237.82 156,797 15.71 .12
1970 216.15 1,114.57 170,538 19.39 .13
1971 359.85 1,677.04 199,979 21.46 .18
1972 517.19 2,227.78 236,196 22.71 .22
1973 621.28 2,700.02 264,365 23.01 .23
1974 532.07 2,221.22 287,583 23.95 .18
1975 500.33 2,149.95 329,015 23.27 .15
1976 775.24 3,153.20 381,671 24.59 .20
1977 1,151.34 4,510.10 447,872 25.53 .26
1978 1,485.75 5,720.85 510,754 25.97 .29
1979 1,307.23 5,068.42 566,726 25.79 .23
Source: Combined Financial Statements: FSLIC-Insured Savings and Loan Associations, U.S.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Annual)15
1979, S&Ls transferred 2.54 percent of their assets to the U.S. Treasury. Had they
retained these funds and invested them advantageously, their current condition
would be less strained. Why did they pay taxes that they could so easily have
avoided?
The answer is that by not realizing capital losses on their mortgage
portfolios, insured S&ls kept their net worth from falling below the level required
to stay eligible for FSLIC insurance. FSLIC capital-adequacy requirements were
lowered and simplified in November, 1980. But during the 1965-1979 period they
were complex in structure. FSLIC regulations obliged every insured institution to
maintain net worth equal to five percent of most long—term borrowings, plus
additional requirements determined either by a liability-based or an asset-based
formula, whichever generated the higher amcuntYi
Horton reports that in 1977 FSLIC capital requirements were binding for
every insured S&L. Most S&Ls were constrained by the liability formula, but 22
percent found the asset formula to be the binding one.
The new requirements dispense with the asset formula and lower the liability-
based requirement from 5 to 4 percent. Although this policy action will reduce the
amount of net worth that appears on S&L balance sheets, it promises to strengthen
insured S&Ls by letting them reduce their tax payments. The net effect is to
transfer funds from the U.S. Treasury to S&Ls, much as if the government had
acceded to the industry's longstanding request that it warehouse a portion of S&Ls'
old low-rate mortgages at advantageous prices.
For mutual S&Ls, converting to a stock charter can further expand the
feasible amount of tax write-offs. Capital raised by issuing stock can be used to
support an increased realization of tax-deductible mortgage losses.16
c. How Much is FSLIC Insurance Worth to an S&L?
We have argued that, at least for the last 15 years, the bulk of income-tax
payments made by insured S&Ls are best interpreted as implicit premiums paid to
maintain eligibility for FSLIC insurance. As Table 2 shows, between 1965 and 1979
the average value of these implicit premiums ran about twice the level of the
explicit premium, which is set by law at 83/1000 of one percent of the value of
insured accounts.'
Although the sum of implicit and explicit premiums measures the annual cost
of federal deposit insurance to S&Ls, it is a downward-biased estimate of the
market value that this insurance has for individual S&Ls. The Modigliani-Miller
diagram gives two important insights into this value.
First, given that interest payments on deposits and other forms of S&L debt
are tax-deductible, S&Ls will prefer to hold zero net worth unless costs of
bankruptcy are substantial. But FSLIC forbearance serves to make bankruptcy
costs negligible. Hence, as long as the public believes FSLIC guarantees to be
relatively perfect, an insured S&L would seek to hold as little net worth as the
FSLIC will tolerate.
Second, with the explicit premiums tied to deposits, the value of FSLIC
insurance to an individual firm increases steadily as the value of its net worth falls.
This is because, if the impact of bankruptcy costs were not overridden by FSLIC
guarantees, rising leverage would increase the default-risk premium that an
uninsured firm would need to pay to float its debt.
Taking these propositions together, we can infer that the value of FSLIC
insurance has increased dramatically with accelerating inflation. As the pseudo-
default rate rises on an S&L's past mortgage loans, FSLIC insurance becomes a
better and better bargain. Since 1965, the FSLIC has on average sold its insurance
for implicit and explicit annual fees that have fallen further and further below the17
insurance contract's true market value. In what follows, I argue that it must have
been cheap deposit insurance that sustained the S&L industry during the last 15
years, because differential deposit-rate ceilings offered increasingly less help.
4. Changing Strategies for Regulating S&Ls
During the past 15 years, federal efforts to earmark a substantial pool of
funds for housing finance hardened into a three—part strategy for regulating deposit
institutions.First, tax incentives and limitations on thrift-institution asset—
diversification powers were manipulated to encourage continued thrift—institution
specialization in mortgage loans. Second, legislative and regulatory efforts were
mounted to keep lenders from shifting inflation risk onto mortgage borrowers.
Even as accelerating inflation drove equilibrium mortgage rates above state usury
ceilings, authorities imposed and reinforced "consumer safeguards" (prepayment
and assumability privileges; limitations on mortgage points and rights to escalate
contract interest rates) that served to slow S&Ls' and other mortgage lenders'
efforts to adapt the mortgage contract to offset their increasing exposure to
interest-rate risk. Third, in hopes of repairing the cumulative effects both of
accelerating inflation on S&L net worth and of unfavorable limitations on thrift-
institutions' freedom of contracting, authorities established a system of cartel-like
restrictions on the interest rates that deposit institutions could pay on their
liabilities. The plan was to use deposit-rate ceilings to offset both the cumulative
reduction in S&L mortgage values and the revenue that might be lost by
constraining opportunities on the asset side of S&L balance sheets. The system of
differential deposit-rate ceilings was intended to hold down S&L costs by confer-
ring monopoly rights to low-cost deposits. Table 3 indicates that over time S&L
customers shifted out of passbook accounts into higher—yielding certificates of
deposit, steadily narrowing the subsidy that could be loaded onto the backs of S&L18
TABLE 3
BREAKDOWN OF CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS AT INSURED SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
ACCORDING TO INTEREST RATE EARNED, 1965-1979
Amount EarningPercentage Amount Earning Percentage More Than the of Value Total Value of The Passbook Rate Value of Passbook Rate of Total Accounts Year (in $Millions) Total Accounts (in $Millions) Accounts (in $Millions)
1965 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 106,103 1966 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 109,772 1967 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 120,184 1968 97,996 77.0 29,248 23.0 127,244 1969 89,972 68.7 41,023 31.3 130,995 1970 84,120 59.4 57,583 40.6 141,703 1971 92,310 54.6 76,735 45.4 169,045 1972 101,634 50.6 99,337 49.4 200,971 1973 103,231 46.7 117,663 53.3 220,894 1974 104,403 44.1 132,286 55.9 236,689 1975 119,049 42.7 159,724 .57.3 278,773 1976 132,407 40.3 195,806 59.7 328,213 1977 143,690 37.9 235,092 62.1 378,782 1978 134,762 31.9 287,433 68.1 422,195 1979 116,548 25.3 344,647 74.7 461,195
Source: Savings & Home Financing Source Book (Annual)
Note: N.A. indicates figure is "Not Available19
depositors. On the other hand, a look back at Table 1 establishes that the decline
in asset values became larger and larger.
During the 1970s, accelerating inflation and regulation-induced innovation
combined to make the 1966 regulatory solution increasingly unworkable. D1DMCA
signals the abandonment of the strategy of trying to protect mortgage borrowers
and mortgage lenders at the same time. An interagency committee (the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation Committee or DIDC) has been set up to dismantle
over the next six years the interinstitutional system of federal deposit—rate ceilings
on time and savings deposits. Starting immediately, restrictions on S&Ls' asset
powers and on the price and nonprice terms of future mortgage contracts are to be
relaxed dramatically. Contract interest rates should fluctuate more widely in
future business cycles and schemes for dividing interest-rate risk between borrow-
ers and lenders should proliferate rapidly. Finally, as of January 1, 1981, S&Ls in
every state will also have the power to offer NOW accounts, but to exercise this
power they must meet reserve requirements levied against them by the Fed. This
new liability power is important only in that it allows S&Ls to become "one-stop"
financial-service centers for households. No reason exists to suppose that in itself
the opportunity to offer NOW accounts promises S&Ls an above-normal rate of
profit.
5. How Will S&Ls and Housing Fare in the New Environment?
The rest of this paper concentrates on three classes of effects that DID MCA
will have on S&Ls: effects on S&L profitability, effects on S&L activity in housing
finance, and effects on the structure of the S&L industry. In analyzing these
issues, we must distinguish transitional problems caused by S&Ls' starting from a
weakened position of bookable net worth from the long-term outlook for recapital—
ized firms. It is also important to identify ongoing trends in S&L behavior and in20
housing finance that are driven by forces other thanDID MCA. Chief among these
forces are technological improvements in telecommunicationsand computer
record-keeping.
a. Profitability Effects
Relaxing limitations on S&L asset powers and onthe stipulations that lenders
can incorporate into future mortgage contracts promisesbenefits at least as great
as the increase in costs that could beattributed to the formal demise of deposit—
rate ceilings. However, this is not saying a great deal. The future profitability of
the average S&L would not be greatly threatened even by an uncompensated phase-
out of ceilings on explicit deposit rates. This is because unregulated competitors
and S&L customers' acts of disintermediation ultimately force deposit institutions
to pay competitive rates of return. A gap between competitively determined
opportunity-cost rates and ceiling rates on explicit interest payments generates
market pressures on S&Ls to close the gap with such implicit interest payments as
merchandise premiums and subsidized account services. To keep from losing
deposits to traditional and nontraditional competitors, S&Ls were induced to
expand both their branch-office systems and their service operations and to run
them at a loss. However, these developments occur after a lag and with an
accompanying effort to discriminate among more and less interest-sensitive-
customers.
In competitive deposit markets, the sum of explicit and implicit interest on
every type of deposit must equal in thelong run themarket-determined opportuni—
ty cost for funds. Even in regulated deposit markets, much the same result holds.
This is because long-run costs of avoiding the burdens of deposit-rate regulation
are negligible. Over time, customer substitution and regulation-induced innovation
by unregulated and unregulated financial institutions move implicit ratesinexor-21
ably toward the free-market solution. Table 3 records the steady shift of S&L
customer funds from passbook savings into higher-yielding certificate accounts,
while Table 4 shows how much more rapidly branch-office networks were expanded
by S&Ls than by commercial banks.
If monopoly power does exist in some local savings-deposit markets, it traces
to geographic restraints on entry by new or nonlocal competitors that DID MCA
does not address. In the long run, government—enforced barriers to entry, not
deposit-rate ceilings, have allowed some institutions to exploit the less interest-
sensitive customers in their client base. However, opportunities for negating entry
regulation have expanded rapidly during the last 15 years. Continuing improve-
ments in electronic methods of communication and record—keeping have made the
physical distance between customers and a financial firm's head office an increas-
ingly ineffective barrier to entry into far-flung local markets. The pre-existing
regional and institutional segmentation of competition for household savings is
rapidly being arbitraged away, as customers and firms substitute innovative
instruments and arrangements for traditionally regulated items. For example,
banks have encouraged interest-sensitive customers to substitute non-deposit
liabilities for deposits and large banks have developed an interstate presence by
substituting the operations of nonbank holding-company affiliates for prohibited
branch offices.Similarly, unregulated competitors whose liabilities are not
explicitly insured by the federal government-1 have offered households attractive
new substitutes for deposits in the form of investment trusts and money-market
funds, small-denomination bonds, and brokerage cash-management accounts.
j. A Geometric Analysis of the Effects of Disintermediation
Although S&Ls may possess monopsony power in markets for small-denomina-
tion instruments, markets for large-denomination liabilities are highly competitive.Table 4
AVERAGE NUMBER OF BRANCH OFFICES AT INSURED
U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SAVINGS-AND-LOAN
ASSOCIATIONS, 1965 TO 1979
















Source:Calculated from Changes Among Operating Banks and Branches (FDIC,
Annual) Savings & Loan Financing Source Book (Annual), and SL
Fact Book (Annual).
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As profit-maximizing arbitrageurs, S&Ls must bid up the implicitplus explicit
returns on their competitive liabilities to the risk-adjusted rate they can earn on
new loans. All this is illustrated in Figures H and III. Figure II portrays the impact
effect of introducing a binding ceiling on the explicit interest rate that S&Lsmay
pay on small-denomination deposits. S&Ls' demand for small-denomination depos-
its falls to zero above LD' a trigger rate which lies below the competitively
determined interest rate paid on large-denomination accounts by the amount of an
allowance for the marginal cost of administering small accounts. Before the
ceiling isimposed,the small-denomination market clears at the rate'SD ='F
(which in full equilibrium also equals LD and the quantity XSD =X.Enforcing
the ceiling rate <ilowers the equilibrium quantity of small—denomination
deposits to XQ; the decrease in deposits XF -
XQmeasures the amount of customer
disintermediation. On every dollar of post-ceiling depositsXQ, S&L profits
increase by the amount of the interest differential'F —'Q• Theincrease in S&L
profits is depicted as a shaded rectangle.
As Figure ifi illustrates, this is the beginning rather than the end of the story.
Wheneverexceeds the ceiling, S&Ls are led to invent discriminatory schemes for
offering higher rates to the interest-sensitive owners of the disintermediated
balances, XF -XQ.Because this discrimination is imperfect, a higher IteffeetiveYT
ceiling rate develops at i .Alsoover time, unregulated competition for small-
denomination funds develops substitutes that make the supply curve more elastic,
rotating it clockwise through the free-market point F' XF). These developments
increase the amount of disintermediation and steadily pinch the benefits that S&Ls
derive from the ceiling. If innovation is costless, the long—run equilibrium supply



































































































































































































































































































































































































ii. Difficulties of Pricing Mortgage Options
The Regulation-Q era has shown that, except for transition periods during
which portfolios adjust to changing regulatory arrangements, deposit-rate ceilings
cannot force households to lend funds to S&Ls at after—tax rates of total return
that lie below the anticipated rate of inflation. Arguing symmetrically, neither
can restrictions on S&L asset powers force them, except temporarily, to make
unprofitable loans.To keep making mortgage loans in an environment of
accelerating change, S&Ls need the freedom to price the various risks inherent in
the mortgages they make.
Once it is recognized that S&Ls have increasingly been forced to pay near—
market rates of interest for household funds, it follows that restrictions on S&L
loan opportunities and contracts, not deposit-rate ceilings, must be responsible for
the extensive disintermediation observed near the peak of the last three interest—
rate cycles. If S&Ls' lending prospects offered an opportunity for risk-adjusted
profit, they would not have allowed loanable funds to be bid away from them. Both
state and federal governments impose a series of restrictions affecting the
prospective profitability of mortgage c ontracts.L1
State-imposed restrictions on mortgage contracts include: usury ceilings and
restrictions on loan origination fees; requirements that borrowers retain advanta-
geous prepayment privileges; and limitations on the ability to retain interest
earned on escrow accounts and to enforce due-on-sale clauses. Prepayment and
assumability privileges confer on mortgagors a pair of options that, taken together,
insure borrowers against interest-rate risk. If interest rates fall, the prepayment
option allows a mortgagor to truncate the capital losses that his mortgage contract
would otherwise accrue. If interest rates rise, the assumability feature allows the
mortgagor to retain at least some of the capital gain on his mortgage loan even if
he should choose to sell the property that serves as security for the loan. Near26
business-cycle peaks, growing interest-rate uncertainty increases the value of both
options, although the mounting threat of recession makes the prepayment option
particularly valuable.It is precisely at these times that usury ceilings and
restrictions on loan-origination fees constrain a lender's ability to collect an
adequate price for issuing these options.
DID MCA permanently pre-empts usury ceilings on first-mortgage loans made
by deposit institutions, subject to an override by individual state legislatures that
act within three years to reimpose these ceilings. In addition, evolving new forms
of mortgage instruments offer nonprice ways of completing these markets in the
future. Shared—appreciation mortgages (in which lenders receive a prenegotiated
share of any profit a mortgagor makes on the sale of his house) and roll-over
mortgages establish offsetting options on the lender's side.
While state-level restrictions have been the crucial ones, federal intervention
in mortgage markets has grown substantially in recent years. In part because
ceilings on deposit interest led banks and thrift institutions throughout the
Regulation-Q era to grant substantial depositors preferential access to mortgage
loans, unsatisfied borrowers perceived themselves to have been unfairly treated
and pressed Congress to adopt a series of federal laws placing new restrictions on
mortgage lending. An extensive catalogue of federal legislation came into being,
aimed at preventing institutions from discriminating in their mortgage lending:
The Fair Housing Act (1968); The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974); The Real
Estate Mortgage Settlement Act (1974); The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975);
and The Community Reinvestment Act (1977). These laws have created new
consumerist heroes, increased federal-agency payrolls, and imposed substantial
administrative costs on mortgage lenders. One important benefit that deposit
institutions will garner from eliminating deposit-rate ceilings will be a diminution
in political pressure for more such legislation.27
iii. S&L Lobbyists Can Now Focus on the Right Political Wars
In my view, differential deposit-rate ceilings were of substantial help to the
average S&L for less than a decade. A turning point occurred in about 1974 when
high-interest deposit substitutes became permanently available in $1,000 denomin-
ations and passbook accounts ceased to be the dominant form of S&L liability.
From this point on, S&L trade associations largely misallocated their lobbying
effort, lavishing time and energy on preserving an ultimately unworkable federal
system of differential deposit-rate ceilings rather than searching for truly sustain-
able ways to increase future profits. Agreeing to jettison the ceilings would have
freed them politically to concentrate on eliminating unrealistic state usury ceilings
on mortgage loans and overcoming activist consumerist pressure for anti-lender
contractual safeguards for mortgage borrowers. S&L lobbyists can be likened in
the years after 1974 to farmers so intent on controlling weeds that they fail to
notice that grasshoppers are devouring their crops.
b. Effects on S&L Activity in Housing Finance
Uncritical acceptance of the legislative immutability of usury ceilings and of
politically imposed "consumer safeguards" in mortgage contracts impairs popular
discussion of the future course of housing finance. Two fallacious allegations have
been widely voiced:
1.Differential deposit-rate ceilings forced S&L depositors to subsidize S&L
borrowers, both ex jandex ante. Without this subsidy, mortgage
lending would be unprofitable for S&Ls.
2.In a world of perennially accelerating inflation, fixed-rate instruments
(which most mortgage borrowers favor) are inherently unattractive to
lenders.28
i. Allegation Number 1
The first proposition is mistaken in two ways. First, in a narrow sense, S&L
depositors could subsidize no one but S&Ls and market forces tended over time to
squeeze this subsidy to the vanishing point. Ex ,itwas S&Ls who did the
subsidizing. If they subsidized mortgage borrowers ex ante as well, it could only be
because of government-enforced restrictions on mortgage interest rates, on S&L
investment alternatives, and on the prepayment restrictions and rate-escalation
options they could incorporate into the mortgage contract. However, since (as
Table 5 shows) unconstrained other lenders were active in residential mortgage
markets throughout the 1960s and 1970s, ex ante subsidization could not have
proceeded beyond extracting quasi-rents that inframarginal transactions-cost ad-
vantages might otherwise have allowed S&Ls to enjoy. Second, mortgage lending
does not need to be subsidized to be profitable. Subsidizing mortgage interest
rates serves mainly to expand the share of household credit that is collateralized
by the housing stock' Although a subsidized mortgage rate may persuade a set
of marginal households to purchase rather than to lease their place of residence,
households' allocation of mortgage—loan proceeds between expenditures on housing
and on other items in their buet should respond mainly to the relative prices of
housing and other goods.
Many apparent imperfections in credit markets trace predominantly to
implicit competition for deposits. Some depositor-borrowers have received com-
pensation for deposit balances in the form of preferred credit accommodation,
while other depositors have held larger balances than they otherwise would have as
a way of paying implicit interest on loans whose contract interest rate was
restrained by usury ceilings. Deposit institutions (particularly commercial banks)
have found it advantageous to offer their regular depositors (especially those with













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although accelerating inflation has benefited borrowers ex ,ithas not
been the case that depositors were subsidizing borrowers ex ante. Hence, it is
superficial to suppose that borrowers will be disadvantaged by deposit-rate deregu
lation. What deposit—rate deregulation will do is to standardize the currency in
which institutions bid for customer funds and in which customers bid for institu-
tional credit.
ii. Allegation Number 2
The second proposition is mistaken in that it makes no reference to relative
security prices.Just as any other type of risk, inflation risk must have an
equilibrium market price. If fixed—rate mortgages (FRMs) do not incorporate an
allowance sufficient to pay that price, lenders will (as far as the law allows them)
make alternative investments. At the same time, if FRM lenders try to hold out
for allowances that lie above the market price for bearing inflation risk, borrowers
will choose not to issue fixed-rate mortgages at alL From 1965 through 1979, ex
allowances for inflation-risk have turned out to be too low. Precisely for this
reason, fixed-rate lenders are currently demanding increased ex ante allowances
for inflation risk. Borrowers who feel that the allowances demanded are too high
are free to boycott the FRM market: to issue short-term balloon notes and other
types of variable—rate mortgages (YRMs). But if market forces are allowed to
operate, they will establish relative prices on fixed—rate and variable—rate mort-
gage contracts that allow the two types of instruments to coexist.If (as one would
suspect) institutional lenders have a comparative advantage over household borrow-
ers in bearing interest-rate risk, over time the equilibrium volume of FRM lending
would greatly exceed the volume of YRM loans.
In suspending state-imposed ceilings on mortgage interest rates and in
expanding the set of alternative investments that S&Ls may make, D1DMCA makes31
S&Ls better able to protect themselves from temporary political exploitation by
ccnsumerist groups. In the future, when inflationary pressures increase equilibrium
yields on fixed-rate instruments, unless the extent of borrowers' prepayment
options or the interest rate on FRMs adjust accordingly, S&L fixed-rate mortgage
lending may be expected to dry up. In the latter case, since S&Ls cannot be forced
to make loans that seem unprofitable ex ante, would-be borrowers who greatly
prefer an FRM to a VRM would ultimately be led by their own self—interest to
generate political pressure on legislators to permit prepayment penalties and/or to
relax applicable usury ceilings. On the other hand, if restrictions on lenders' rights
to index mortgage interest rates to future movements in the rate earned on new
mortgages make variable—rate lending less attractive than fixed-rate lending, S&Ls
can stop making these loans. Borrowers who prefer a variable-rate instrument will
bring political pressure on legislators to increase their own (and therefore S&Ls')
contracting freedom.Finally, if limitations on both FRMs and VRMs make
mortgage lending temporarily less attractive to S&Ls than other forms of consumer
lending, customer political pressure for freer contracting in mortgage markets will
be particularly intense.
it is important to see that state laws that require every mortgage contract to
incorporate a specific set of borrower-oriented options unfairly drive up the price
of mortgage credit to any resident for whom these options have little value.
Similarly, state legislators that try to prevent lenders from pricing borrower
options will end up reducing the flow of mortgage credit in their state.
Assuming that returns from consumer lending and other newly authorized
S&L activities already stand at roughly competitive levels, S&Ls' comparative
advantage in investment activity (which is reinforced by incentive features in the
federal tax treatment of bad-debt reserves) should continue to lie in the field of32
housing finance. The value of S&Ls' expanded asset powers lies in reducing the
effectiveness of pre-existing local cartels in consumer-loan markets (wherever
these exist), in providing exit options that make it more difficult for political
forces to impose onerous terms on mortgage lenders, and in making it easier for
firms that wish to narrow the difference between the average maturities of their
assets and liabilities to achieve a more balanced portfolio.
c. Effects on S&L Industry Structure
We have argued that, by itself, deposit—rate reregulation threatens the
profitability of banks and thrifts far less than is popularlybelieved.Most
institutions have already been paying implicit interest at a competitive leveL
What is needed is a shift in divisional priorities within individual firms.Service
departments and individual branch offices must be askedto pay their own way.
Top management must energetically endeavor to increase employeeproductivity
and service fees. As in the past, S&L managers must maintain an ongoingsearch
for profitable new lines of service.However, they must now seek equally
energetically to identify and eliminate services whose past profitability wasrooted
in the need to circumvent unrealistic ceilings on deposit interest. Running branch
and service operations at a loss was a good strategy for overcomingrestraints on
the payment of explicit interest, but for most customers an expandedflow of
banking services is a poor substitute for an increasedflow of dollar returns.
Customers can always buy services withmoney, but they cannot easily "spend"the
value of banking services in other markets.
Deregulating explicit deposit rates threatens to restructure the S&L industry
primarily because S&Ls that differ in size or in competitiveand regulatory
circumstances figure to have differential capacities to adapt to thedemands of
competing explicitly with other deposit institutions andvarious retail-oriented33
investment pools. It is clear that, for the industry as a whole, the resources with
which to make increased payments of explicit interest can not come from existing
profits. The failure of deposit institutions to experience supernormal profitability
confirms the hypothesis that they have for the most part paid competitive interest
rates for the deposit funds they have retained and charged competitive rates for
the loans that they made. As we have indicated, the success of money-market
funds and brokerage cash-management accounts in no way proves that the bulk of
bank and S&L deposit rates remained uncompetitive over time. Competition from
unregulated institutions is the chief mechanism for pressuring traditional deposit
institutions into offering fair value to interest-sensitive customers. However,
adjustments in arrangements for paying implicit interest tend both to be more
discriminatory and to lag further behind movements in market interest rates than
unregulated changes in explicit interest payments would.
When competition for deposits is implicit, bank accounting systems misallo-
cate costs and fees both over time and between the deposit and loan function. In
moving to an environment of explicit competition, individual deposit institutions
must look for ways to cut back the implicit interest inherent in existing operations.
Institutions should cut back account services whose value to deposit customers is
not sufficient to cover costs. In particular, institutions should look to close branch
offices that can't truly support themselves, especially those whose sites and
structures have attractive alternative uses. Firm and industry consolidation seems
inescapable.
We can distinguish different sets of pressures on institutions that differ in
size and that operate in different regional markets. Pressures also differ between
wholesale and retail banking markets. On the retail side, DID MCA empowers S&Ls
to invade in a big way traditional bank and finance-company markets for household34
loans. Simultaneously, the securities industry, through cash-management accounts
and money-market funds, and large nonfinancial borrowers (exemplified by Sears
Roebuck investment certificates and Commonwealth of Massachusetts minibonds)
are gearing up to fight for deposit institutions' largest and most stable sources of
household funds.
Small institutions can probably support themselves by tailoring their opera-
tions closely to local needs and to chauvinistic civic spirit in the communities they
serve. The advantage of a local customer base is increased by the difficulties that
nonlocal managements will have in coping with community-group pressures for
social-priority credit allocation symbolized by the Community Reinvestment Act.
In contrast, medium-sized institutions that have competed for retail and wholesale
accounts in nonlocal or regional markets are threatened by the internationalization
of funds competition, by economies of scale in intermediation activities, and by
economies of producing a wide range of customer services jointly ("scope econo—
mies" made possible by the technology of electronic funds transfer and record-
keeping).In the face of evolving scope economies, one must be careful in
interpreting empirical evidence gathered in the 1960s and early 1970s, indicating
that, once a deposit institution reaches $100 million in deposits, economies of
operation increase only very gradua1ly.i1To survive in a price-competitive
environment as a force in wholesale funds markets, an institution's assets may have
to exceed several billion dollars.
Clearly, the industry's future would be brighter if regulatory authcrities were
to adopt a sympathetic policy toward mergers and acquisitions. Even during the
pre-DIDMCA regime, the S&L industry was consolidating in preparation for explicit
interest-rate competition. No matter how vehemently S&L managers may have
encouraged their lobbyists to resist increases in deposit-rate ceilings, they would35
have to had kept their eyes tightly closed to have missed the market's handwriting
on their wails. A continuing decline in the number of independent S&Ls and a
marked growth in average firm size are well-established trends.
At the end of 1979, FHLBB figures show 4,709 S&Ls. This number lies fully
23 percent below the corresponding figure for 1965. Table 6 shows an extensive
pattern of merger activity.Holding—company affiliation may have increased,
too.iJ'Today the average S&L is substantially larger and has almost three more
branch offices than the half-office it showed in 1965. More importantly, S&Ls
have grown on average both in asset size and in branch offices relative to
commercial banks.
In 1965, the average insured commercial bank had $27.7 million in total
assets and 1.17 branch offices, while the average S&L had only $21.0 million in
assets and 0.48 of a branch office. By yearend 1979, the average S&L was
substantially larger in asset size and had more branch offices than the average
commercial bank. In fact, the average S&L has surpassed the critical $100-million
asset size at which economies of scale are generally believed to level off.
Of course, the need for further adjustment will be greater if Congress should
drop the other regulatory shoe and proceed to dismantle regulatory barriers against
interstate branching and takeovers. Under geographic entry deregulation, substan-
tial local differences would be observed in the short run due to variation across
states in restrictions on branch offices, with Illinois sure to be one of the toughest
battlegrounds. In the short run, the industry consolidation dictated by deposit-rate
regulation would proceed all the more rapidly, the greater the degree of geographic
deregulation allowed.Alternative regulatory strategies range from allowing
nationwide operation to relaxing barriers across broad multistate economic regions,
across neighboring states, or merely within metropolitan market areas. GeographicTABLE 6
NUMBER OF MERGERS AMONG INSURED S&Ls, 1965-1979
Year State-chartered Federal—charteredTotal
1965 18 14 32
1966 30 12 42
1967 42 22 64
1968 36 11 47
1969 79 20 99
1970 80 38 118
1971 70 62 132
1972 38 69 107
1973 48 76 124
1974 50 82 132
1975 52 59 111
1976 31 54 85
1977 27 17 44
1978 26 18 44
1979 20 17 37
Source: U.S. League of Savings Associations, Savings and Loan Fact Book (Annual).
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restrictions on mergers and acquisitions raise the cost toaggressive institutions of
entering distant markets, forcing them to operate through specialized"nonbanking"
holding-company subsidiaries. The deposit-gathering and investmentpowers of
subsidiaries are narrower than those of traditional banksand savings institutions
and, because they can only be imperfectly integrated with those ofthe lead
institution, their operations are likely to be more costly.
Geographic restrictions on banking markets tend to insulatemanagers of
inefficient institutions (especially mutual ones) from thediscipline of takeover
pressure. They simultaneously limit the sell—out options available to stockholders
of inefficient institutions. Both effects tendperversely to decrease the value of
S&Ls' ongoing charters. Such policies expand the takeoveropportunities of large
in-state institutions relative to those of regionalor national money-center institu-
tions. Because bars against interstatemergers and acquisitions tend to benefit
managers of inefficient mutual institutions and expansion-mindedlarge banks in
states with attractive market areas, we mustexpect these parties to lead the fight
to retain them.
Whether or not a severe financial crisis occursairing DIDMCA's 6-year
phase-out period is crucially important. Since Congress retainsan abiding concern
for the viability of the thrift industry and forthe flow of housing credit, a
developing financial crisis would open channels for S&Llobbyists to put great
political pressure on the DIDC and on Congress to slowor even to abort the
transition to unregulated deposit rates. With Fed freedomto follow disinflationary
policies strengthened politically by comprehensivereserve-requirement powers and
with post—election pressures on politicians todisinflate, the possibility of another
round of sky-high interest rates is far from negligible. Ifhigh interest were to
threaten a wave of thrift-institution failures,problems could be lessened by40
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